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Abstract 
The article discusses the development and impact of the German Council of Economic Experts 
(GCEE). Firstly, the author studies the historical origins and the institutional setup of the GCEE. In 
the second step, an analyse of the impact of the annual reports of the German Council is given, along 
with the international comparison with other advisory boards. Finally, the paper discusses the current 
economic challenges and the need of modernization of the GCEE in special and political advisory 
boards in general. 
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INTRODUCTION 
‘Der Sachverständigenrat’ (engl. German Council of Economic Experts, in short: 
GCEE) was founded as an independent committee devoted to economic advice to 
the government 50 years ago, on June 26th, 1963. The main task was the assessment of 
the overall economic development in Germany. The law regarding the formation of 
the ‘German Council of Economic Experts’ (Gesetz des Sachverständigenrates, SVRG) 
is in place up to this day, and it states that the board has to contribute "<to the 
simplification of rigorous scientific opinions at all economic authorities as well as in 
the public<"(§ 1 SVRG). The GCEE has been fulfilling this demand with its annual 
reports since the foundation year. Thus, the annual reports in autumn became an 
essential component of the economic discussion in Germany. 
The institutional setup of the GCEE is of outstanding importance in Germany. In 
accordance with §2 of the GCEE law, the council shall examine "<how in regard to 
the free competition law, price-stability, a high level of employment and a trade 
balance together with sustainable economic growth can be ensured at the same 
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time." Although there have been significant economic and institutional changes in 
Europe within the past fifty years, these objectives are still relevant today. Since 
January 1st, 1999, Germany has been a member of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the exchange rate of the Deutsche-Mark has been fixed irrevocably. 
Nevertheless, the main objective of the GCEE is still concentrated on the domestic 
economic policy tasks. The law of the GCEE is similar to the law of stability and 
economic growth adopted in Germany in 1967. Both laws are of paramount 
importance up to the date and impose a forward-looking setup in Germany’s 
political environment. This was due to bold efforts of Ludwig Erhard, the 1st federal 
minister of economics and Germany’s 2nd Chancellor. 
The article takes the 50th anniversary of the GCEE as an opportunity to introspect its 
origins and developments. Section 2 provides a surveying view on the creation 
phase of the GCEE. This is followed by a unique evaluation of the GCEE’s reports 
from 1964 to 2012, in section 3. In section 4, an international comparison with the 
most important advisory boards is presented. By doing so, I discuss the challenges 
for economic and political consulting bodies in modern democracy and the 
globalized world in general. These insights are finally analysed in section 5, and 
thereupon I propose some ideas for the modernization of the GCEE in special and 
advisory boards in general. Section 6 concludes the article. 
ORIGINS OF THE GERMAN COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS 
Historical Background 
The demand for an economic expert committee in Germany first arose from several 
academic experts and other advisory boards in the 1950s. One of these was the 
scientific advisory board of the Federal Ministry of Economics (BWM), which 
mentioned such a committee in a report (Blesgen and Preiser, 1999). This debate 
gained pace in the subsequent years, and the topic was discussed again in the 
advisory board of the BWM in September, 1954. At the same time, there was a 
discussion among politicians whether to create another, however, independent 
advisory board in Germany. The liberal democrats (FDP), for instance, made a 
proposal for the creation of an economic advisory board on 11th of October, 1955 
(BArch, 37(8)). Only one year later, on June 6th, 1956, the social democrats (SPD) 
introduced a bill for the promotion of a Committee of Economic Experts that had 
been advising the government on sustainable growth for the overall economy. On 
the one hand, such a new committee had to aim for professional economic advice, 
but on the other hand, it had to mitigate the general "Hysteria" in Germany's 
booming economy in the late 1950s. Whilst the SPD circles suggested that the 
politically independent committee mainly advise on macroeconomic questions, the 
FDP wanted the committee to mitigate the "Babylonian confusion of languages" in 
the existing wage negotiations (Nützennadel, 2002). Although the idea of a German 
Council of Economic Experts (GCEE) appealed to the Christian democrats and 
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conservatives (CDU and CSU), the government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
did not take any initiative at the beginning. Only in 1958, this topic was placed on 
the agenda by the CDU representative and a member of the executive board of the 
CDU, Curt Becker. On February 1st, 1958, there was a discussion on this topic 
between Curt Becker and the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard. 
In this conversation, they discussed the idea of an independent expert board or 
council. The suggestion of establishing a scientific GCEE was appealing to the 
Minister of Economic Affairs for two reasons: firstly, Ludwig Erhard wanted to 
avoid another federal economic council consisting of representatives of the labour 
unions and trade associations, which was preferred by Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer. It was due to Erhard’s regulative conviction in the ‘Social Market 
Economy’, in which he considered the strict separation between state duties and 
private-sector activities as a prerequisite. Secondly, Ludwig Erhard hoped that a 
committee of independent scientists would support his vision on the successful free 
competition and free market course. Presumably, he expected, through the 
institutionalization of an independent and scientific expert council, that the basic 
principles of the social market economy would be established finally. At that time, 
this was important for Germany, a young and fragile country after Second World 
War. 
However, Erhard thought little of Curt Becker's plan to associate the committee with 
a "mediator function" in wage negotiations, which was planned years ago by the 
FDP. In fact, Ludwig Erhard considered this as a glaring violation of the principles 
of the social market economy – the German model. Any restriction or intervention in 
the price mechanism is considered as a violation of the social market economy. 
According to Erhard, the state had to stay out of wage negotiations and the price 
mechanism, which was also established upon the free and collective wage 
bargaining concept in Germany (BArch Vol. 1254, No. 330). Instead, Erhard wanted 
to assign the committee the task of examining macroeconomic goals such as price 
stability, full employment and sustainable economic growth. The Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, discussed this conception with representatives of 
trade associations and labour unions in March, 1958. 
Although there was still no political agreement on the aims and tasks, the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Affairs immediately started drafting a bill. The outline was 
orientated to the so-called "magical four-sided figure" of full employment, price 
stability, trade balance and sustainable economic growth. The balance among these 
four objectives was established again years later, on June 8, 1967 with the stability 
and growth law. In drafting a bill for the German Council of Economic Experts, 
leading professors, such as Kromphardt, Preiser and Sauermann, were involved too. 
However, their ideas were not always the same with the suggestions by the Federal 
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Minister of Economic Affairs. A critical issue between the scientists and the minister 
was about the balance of financial and staff independence of the new advisory 
board. Up until now, its absolute independence from all political influences is a 
unique and important element of the GCEE's outstanding reputation. 
After Ludwig Erhard had forwarded the draft bill to Konrad Adenauer, without any 
previous discussion, Adenauer expressed ‚serious doubts‛ about a German Council 
of Economic Experts in a letter to Erhard on May 22, 1958. According to Adenauer, 
an independent committee could "under circumstances completely take over the 
reins from the Federal Government and also me, who bears the responsibility" (Pohl, 
1992). The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs was in an inferior position during 
the quarrel with the Chancellor due to the German constitution, which grants the 
Chancellor the final word. Furthermore, there was another point of criticism besides 
the ideological differences. Chancellor Adenauer had, according to historical 
documents, an underlying scepticism about scholars in general. He feared that 
critical reports could cause problems within the current government. Therefore, 
Konrad Adenauer did not want to give the GCEE the right to develop policy 
recommendations or proposals. Konrad Adenauer strongly believed that this would 
endanger the primacy of politics and that a scholar dictatorship could develop in the 
end. Adenauer was not the only one with this attitude at that time. It was rather a 
spirit of the time. Quite similar argued another German Minister Kurt Schmücker: ‚I 
won’t correct myself on my political beliefs, not even by the best expertise!‛ 
Given these circumstances, the draft bill was rejected at first. However, 
approximately four years later in spring 1962, the draft bill was placed on the agenda 
once again. There were three reasons behind the renewed attempt: firstly, the 
European institutional framework had changed. With the Treaty of Roma in 1958, 
the German government demanded a better coordination of the economic policy 
within the European Economic Community (EEC) (BArch B 136(7443). The 
development of the necessary instruments was assigned to the state secretary Alfred 
Müller-Armack, a close friend of Ludwig Erhard. Secondly, the political situation in 
Germany was different too. The Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was forced to resign 
before the expiration of his full legislative period after the parliamentary elections in 
1961. This has weakened the position of the chancellor significantly. Thirdly, the 
economic condition demanded an urgent need for action. The overheating of the 
economy was threatening Germany as a result of an export boom. The rate of 
inflation had already arrived at three per cent. Moreover, there was a revaluation of 
the D-Mark due to the restrictive policy of the German Bundesbank. In addition, it 
came to a heavy imbalance in the labour market, as there was an insufficiency in 
workers to fulfil the excessive vacancies in the labour market. In this situation, 
Adenauer’s resistance immerged and he finally approved the foundation of the 
German Council of Economic Experts. 
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Foundation and Final Conception 
Ludwig Erhard thereupon brought up his suggestion to Chancellor Adenauer again 
(BArch, B 136(7452). He convinced Adenauer by the renewed proposal with the 
‚substantial threats‛ to price stability, which resulted from the considerable wage 
increases during the years of boom. Despite Adenauer's doubts, which Erhard tried 
to mitigate beforehand, the government discussed the bill of a GCEE on April 11th, 
1962 (BArch B 136(7452). There is nothing officially reported on the meeting itself, 
however, the bill was denied once more. Nevertheless, soon after some minor 
changes, the government and parliament approved it with an overwhelming 
majority on June 26, 1963. 
Thereby the highly regarded and independent German Council of Economic Experts 
(GCEE) was inaugurated on August 14, 1963. Since then, there have been only two 
insignificant changes concerning §6 of the law in 1966 and 1967. The first change of 
the bill required that the federal government must prepare an official answer 
statement on each annual report within eight weeks after publication. Today, this 
request is carried out by the government on a regular basis with the publication of 
the annual economy report (‘Jahreswirtschaftsbericht’) in January. The second 
change of the bill merged the GCEE's targets with a growth law implemented on 
June 8, 1967. Thus, the GCEE is based on a solid legal basis, which is an excellent 
example for legal stability. Due to the long-run legal stability and the distinguished 
board members of the GCEE – in public the five sage of economy – economic policy 
is on professional footing in Germany. Since then, the GCEE has been serving the 
public as a credible anchor for ‚good‛ economic policy suggestions and a 
stabilization of economic expectations. 
Fortunately, the disagreement on the question, whether the GCEE shall receive the 
right for proposal making, was resolved after intense arguments between both sides. 
It was put in concrete terms as follows: "The GCEE shall show undesirable economic 
developments and options for their avoidance or elimination, however, not express 
any recommendations for certain economic or socio-political matters" (§ 2 SVRG). 
This wording provides the GCEE with flexibility for both normative statements and 
concrete suggestions. As long as the GCEE’s economic suggestions are not expressed 
as recommendations with the aim to avoid undesirable economic developments, it is 
according to the law accepted. This possibility has been used by the GCEE for the 
past 50 years – in fact, even more intensively over the recent decade (cf. section 3). 
The tasks of the GCEE are even more flexible than explained until now. Besides the 
periodical analysis and forecast of the economic situation, the GCEE has extended its 
analysis to other fields, such as public finance, tax policy, financial markets, 
monetary policy, labour markets and social policy. In the course of the intellectual 
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history and development of economics, the board has gone through different 
ideological phases in all fields of economics. In the 1960s and 1970s, the council 
believed that short-run business cycle policy is the best strategy to stabilize the 
economy. However, this initial period of Keynesian policy quickly ended. It was 
followed by a medium to long-term growth conception. In principle, the GCEE 
followed the so-called regulatory principles of the ‘Social Market Economy’ – a 
typical long-run view. This reorientation was supported by the supply-side 
revolution in economics sciences of the 1980s developed by Nobel laureate Robert 
Solow and his followers (Sievert, 2003). This mainly explains why the GCEE 
demands wage restraints aligned with price stability and sound public finances in 
almost all reports over the past three decades. Over the time, the GCEE got more 
importance because now the reports are directly submitted to the Chancellor and 
not, as in the beginning, to the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs. 
The quality of the GCEE reports has always been serving as a guideline to the acting 
politicians up to this day. Yet politicians are not always satisfied with the 
suggestions in the reports. Therefore, it happens rather frequently within debates of 
the German parliament that it is tried to refer to pages in the report that are liked the 
most, whilst other parts, with opposing arguments, are not mentioned at all (quote, 
Chancellor Schröder, 2003). In brief, cherry pinking is a common strategy in (even in 
German) politics. 
ANALYSIS OF THE GCEE'S REPORTS 
The GCEE reports are the megaphone of the committee, and accomplish their task in 
accordance with §1 SVRG, contributing to "<the simplification of rigorous scientific 
opinions at all economic authorities as well as in the public<" In this respect, an 
analysis of the reports provides an important insight to the action and function of 
the GCEE. I analyse all reports of the GCEE from 1964 to 20121. The reports are 
evaluated based on quantitative and qualitative measures. 
The first annual report, consisting of 226 pages, was published in 1964. Since then, 
the volume of pages grew continuously; according to my linear regression, about 11 
pages every year. The volume of pages averages at approximately 400 pages. In 
2004, the absolute maximum was reached, with a volume of 1077 pages (Figure 1). 
The minimum, 193 pages, was in 1968. Figure 1 depicts the reports’ development 
with respect to the number of pages. It is noticeable that the volume of pages has 
been diminishing since 2005. However, since that time, the GCEE has been 
publishing at least one additional special report every year (hatched bars). This shift 
was demanded by policy-makers and later on executed by the chair professor Rürup 
(Nienhaus 2009). 
                                                 
1The annual reports 1974, 1997 and 1999 could not be evaluated due to missing electronic versions and technical 
problems with the PDF. 
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FIGURE 1. VOLUME OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS 
What led to this continuous growth of pages over the years? In my view, as a former 
staff member of the council, there are two reasons: First, an increasing complexity of 
the economy required more sophisticated analysis and methods over the years. 
Moreover, the (empirical) research methodology improved and enabled the council 
to conduct research that is more complex. The second reason is concerning the 
institutional setup and the board members. Since the end of the 1990s, there has been 
an increasing effort by the GCEE to develop concrete reform proposals. These 
proposals, which are always very detailed, including legal and institutional issues, 
increased the number of pages significantly. Examples are proposals about the 
corporate tax reform, the reform of the pension and health care system and a labour 
market reform, especially the model of combination wages. 
This trend of concrete proposals can be exemplified by investigating how often the 
words ‚reform‛ and ‚proposal‛ appear in the annual reports from 1964 to 2012. 
Figure 2 shows an obvious increase of the use of the word ‚reform‛ – in terms of 
reform proposal, health care reform, labour market reform, etc. – over several 
decades. The maximum, 856 times within one report, was reached in 2003; 
consequently, the word ‚reform‛ appeared 1.3 times on each page (Figure 2). A 
similar trend is detected for the word ‚proposal‛, however, not in an obvious 
manner as it is forbidden by law to express a proposal in a GCEE report according to 
§2 SVRG. Behind this growing dynamic was a rise of economic challenges in 
Germany at that time. These challenges are well known: the globalization, the 
European Monetary Union, the aging of the society, unsound public finances, 
geopolitical threats and climate change, as well as terror attacks. 
Now, let me analyse some content-related issues. A long-run economic problem was 
an extremely high unemployment rate in Germany. The black–dashed curve in 
Figure 3 shows the development of the unemployment rate. It is easy to recognize 
the step-like rise of unemployment rates from the beginning of 1970s up until 2005. 
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FIGURE 2. COUNT OF WORDS: ‚REFORM‛ AND ‚PROPOSAL‛ IN THE ANNUAL REPORTS 
Only after discussions and proposals of the GCEE and other committees, policy-
makers implemented bold labour market reforms in 2002 to 2003. Thereafter, these 
reforms reduced the unemployment rate – despite the worldwide crises - 
significantly (Figure 3). Comparing this development with various key words in the 
reports, such as labour market, social, and reform, it is noticeable that there has been 
a concurrent development. This demonstrates that the increasing economic 
challenges caused the GCEE to propose more of the needed reforms in all areas. 
 
FIGURE 3. COUNT OF WORDS: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, LABOUR MARKET, REFORM & 
SOCIAL IN THE ANNUAL REPORTS 
A similar finding is for the words "recession" and "crisis". The increased occurrence 
of these two words falls in the periods of actual recessions. It is interesting to see that 
the word ‚crisis‛ gains a certain momentum, at present times in particular. In Figure 
4, it seems clear that there is a increase in the use of the word "crisis", although the 
word "recession" would be more appropriate. In 2009, there was the most severe 
recession in Germany since the great depression in the 1930s. Germany’s GDP 
dropped by more than 5 per cent in 2009. On the one hand, the frequent use of the 
word ‚crisis‛ indicates a shift in the use of language. The word ‚crisis‛ is used 
simply as a synonym for ‚recession‛ in German language. On the other hand, the 
term ‚crisis‛ stresses the abnormal and exceptional situation in the period between 
2007 to 2012 (Figure 4). 
Another interesting observation results from an analysis of the terms ‚business 
cycle‛ and ‚growth‛. As already mentioned, the GCEE followed Keynesian policy 
until the 1970s. However, this view changed in the 1980s. 
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FIGURE 4. COUNT OF WORDS: ‚RECESSION‛ AND ‚CRISIS‛;  
ACTUAL RECESSIONS ARE GREY AREAS 
Since then, the orientation of GCEE moved towards supply-side economics. Figure 5 
illustrates this graphically. It can be seen that the term ‚growth‛ gained importance 
year by year, and appeared more frequently than ‚business cycle‛ in the late 1980s. 
Later on, the use of both words is more balanced. Note that the term, ‚business 
cycle‛, is still used, but reflects a variety of other meanings in the German language. 
Interestingly, the appearance of the word ‚growth‛ in the reports is a leading 
indicator of real economic activity. This can be detected in the years followed by 
economic booms, e.g. 1987 and a boom between 1989 and 1991 as well as 2002 and a 
boom between 2006 and 2007. Furthermore, it is striking that, during economic 
downturns, the GCEE chose a pragmatic middle path and put some emphasis on 
demand-side policy (stressing ‚business cycle‛) but simultaneously stressing the 
importance of long-run growth. 
 
FIGURE 5. REAL GDP GROWTH VS. COUNT OF WORDS ‚BUSINESS CYCLE‛ AND ‚GROWTH‛ 
IN ANNUAL REPORTS 
Finally, I analyse the public attention to the GCEE based on Google Search data. 
There is a positive correlation between the attention of the GCEE in general and the 
attention of the reports, published in November each year, in special. Google 
searches for ‚GCEE‛, ‚annual report‛ and ‚sage of economy‛ show almost identical 
search patterns. The correlation between these three time-series is positive, and it 
ranges from 0.786 to 0.858 (Google-Trends.com). Furthermore, it is recognizable that 
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the Google search data shows more spikes, and is thus more volatile in the recent 
years. I explain this by two realities: firstly, the publication of the new special reports 
in spring, and secondly, special statements in the course of the European sovereign 
debt crisis. Nevertheless, there remains an interesting observation for future research: 
What are the reasons for the declining public interest, measured by Google data, to 
the GCEE's reports? It may be due to institutional problems and competition with 
other councils in Germany and Europe. Alternatively, it may be due to news 
congestion or a tired public. There is anecdotal evidence that the increasing 
complexity in a globalized economy leads to rising ‚cacophony‛ and over-alarming 
statements of expert boards. Both issues may mitigate the public attention and 
interests to new reports of GCEE. 
THE CHALLENGES OF ADVISORY BOARDS 
International Comparison 
In principle, there are advisory boards worldwide.2 The following section describes 
the differences between the major boards. I discuss the constituent features as well as 
their advantages and disadvantages. In order to obtain a comprehensive overview, 
the section concentrates on the most important and, at the same time, most different 
expert committees: 
a) The German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE)3; 
b) The US-American ‚Council of Economic Advisers‛ (CEA); 
c) The French model of a ‚Conseil d’Analyse Économique‛ (CAE); and 
d) The Dutch model of a ‚Central Planning Bureau‛ (CPB). 
Table 1 compares the four boards across six institutional dimensions: i) legal basis, ii) 
legal order, iii) composition and tenure, iv) frequency of meetings, v) publications 
and vi) independence. The description of the GCEE has been discussed previously. I 
just have to add, that the GCEE consists of 5 board members (renowned professors) 
and a staff of 10 economists. The board members are nominated for five years by 
three intuitions: the government, the trade unions and the employer associations. 
Moreover, the GCEE is fully independent of politics. 
The American Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) features another conception of 
an advisory board. The CEA was established through the ‚Employment Act‛ by 
president Truman in 1946, and is an integral part of the US-administration, which 
belongs to the ‚Executive Office‛ of the American president. The president, in 
accordance with the senate, appoints two to three members of the CEA for two years 
                                                 
2There exists a kind of expert committee even in China: ‚Development Research Center‛ (DRC). This is a part of 
the governmental administration. They are responsible for strategic research in terms of the economy and social 
politics. 
3A similar model is found in Sweden. The ‚Fiscal Policy Council‛ (FPC) is a public authority founded on 1st 
August 2007. The FPC consists of six members and is supported by an administrative office of five employees. 
The task is an independent evaluation of the Swedish fiscal policy. 
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(Cooper, 1987). Consequently, the CEA cooperates with the political bodies in 
Washington D.C. and is more dependent on politics. In contrast to the GCEE, the 
CEA is integrated in the decision-making process of the president and public 
communications. The chair of the CEA has a specific position in this board; he solely 
represents the board and bears full responsibility. Moreover, the chairperson gives 
direct advice to the president in all economic affairs, either through personal 
discussions or in the form of a written briefing. Furthermore, the chair is a member 
of all relevant committees, and takes part in auditing public statements. The two 
other members support the chair and represent the chair in case of her or his 
absence. 
A group of professional staff, a statistical department and an administrative 
department supports the three CEA members. The professional staff consists of 
approximately 30 economists, some of whom are renowned economics professors4. 
These economists are exempt from their duties at the universities, and stay for 
approximately two years at the CEA. Apart from the advisory tasks, the CEA has to 
create growth forecasts in cooperation with the ministries, which are in charge of 
budget planning. It is noteworthy that the considerable influence of the CEA, 
especially the chairperson, is not just due to the concept of the board rather due to 
the presidential system in the US. The president makes decisions on all relevant 
issues. The Cabinet 5  in the US, in contrast to Germany, only has an advisory 
function. 
Despite the potential political influence of the CEA, there exists anecdotal evidence 
that this might not be the reality at all times. Harvard professor Martin Feldstein, 
CEA chair under the Reagan administration from 1982 to 1984, once stated: on the 
one hand, the job was interesting, but on the other hand, it was ‚extremely 
frustrating‛ to receive influence on economic policy issues. A reason for this 
assessment might be the fact that the president has another (private) economic 
advisor besides the CEA. Therefore, the influence of the CEA is depending on 
whether the chairperson and the personal economic advisor of the president have 
the same opinion. 
Undoubtedly, the CEA members, despite the criticism by professor Feldstein, have 
more influence on political projects and decisions than the members of the GCEE. 
Moreover, the CEA members obtain a better internal perspective of the government 
and administration, which is an further advantage. Consequently, it is easier for 
                                                 
4
Since 2013 the highly appreciated Professor of Economy, Jim Stock, for example is the Chief Economist in the CEA. Professor 
Stock, together with Professor Watson, shaped economic research for several years. I meet Jim Stock on the 50th anniversary of 
the GCEE in Berlin.  
5
The US-Cabinet does not meet regularly but this varies from president to president. In the US-President, according to their 
professional competence, appoints the members of the Cabinet. 
 
Bodo Herzog 
Whither the German Council of Economic Experts? The Past and Future of Public Economic Advice 
 
32                                            JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS, VOL.2, ISSUE 3 – SEPTEMBER , 2014, PP. 21-40 
CEA to develop reform proposals in line with the administration and the president. 
However, a disadvantage of this board structure is the political dependence, which 
could result in the refusal of efficient proposals owing to the interests of parties or 
ideological disagreements. 
TABLE 1. ECONOMIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES IN AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
 Germany US France Netherlands 
 Council of Economic 
Experts (GCEE) 
Council of 
Economic Advisers 
(CEA) 
Conseil 
d’analyse 
économique 
(CAE) 
Centraal 
Planbureau – 
CPB 
 
 
 
 
Legal basis 
Law over the 
formation of a 
Council of Economic 
Experts for the 
assessment of the 
overall economic 
development 
(SVRG); (14.8.1963) 
Employment Act of 
1946 (20.2.1946) 
Law 97-766 on 
the formation 
of a Conseil 
d’analyse 
économique; 
(22.7.1997) 
Foundation on 
15.9.1945. ‚Law 
Concerning the 
Preparation of 
the Central 
Economic Plan‛; 
(21.4.1947) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal order 
- Analysis of the 
overall economic 
development and 
growth forecast 
- Examination how 
to establish a stable 
price level, high 
employment and a 
trade balance with 
steady growth 
- Analysis of the 
distribution of 
income and wealth 
- Illustration of 
anomalies and 
possibilities for their 
prevention and 
removal 
- Council supports 
the creation of the 
‚Economic Report 
of the President‛ 
-  Creation of 
proposals, 
recommendations, 
economic studies, 
reports to the 
president or on 
request of the 
president 
- Analysis of 
economic 
development & 
trends 
- Development of 
measures to 
strengthen the free 
market economy 
and to prevent 
business 
fluctuations 
- Publication 
of analyses 
demanded by 
the Premier 
Minister  
- Description 
of economic 
alternatives 
and the 
different 
assumptions 
- Creation of 
economic 
analyses 
- Production of 
studies 
requested by the 
government, the 
parliament, 
unions or 
employer unions 
- quarterly 
economic 
forecast as well 
as a mid-term 
forecast for the 
election cycle 
- scientific 
evaluation of 
reforms and 
analysis of the 
election 
manifestos 
 
 
 
 
Composition 
and tenure 
- Five board 
members 
(Professors) and a 
scientific staff (10 
Senior Economists) 
 
- Tenure of 5 years 
with the possibility 
- Three members 
(Professors), 
amongst a chair as 
well as scientific 
staff (20-30 Senior 
Economists) 
- Tenure usually 2 
years with the 
- approx. 30 
members 
(Professors). 
Staff: 10 Senior 
Economists. 
- Tenure of 2 
years with the 
possibility of 
- One director, 8 
consultants and 
a scientific staff 
of approx. 100 
Senior 
Economists 
- Tenure of 3 to 
15 years 
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of reappointment possibility of 
extension or 
dismissal 
extension 
 
Frequency of 
council 
meetings 
- 2 days a month 
(Dec. to Aug.) and 
fulltime (Sep. to 
Nov.) 
- Part-time 
employment 
- Permanent 
 
 
 
- Fulltime 
employment 
- Monthly plus 
additional 
meetings 
 
- Part-time 
employment 
- Permanent, 
consultants meet 
at least twice a 
year 
 
- Fulltime 
employment 
 
 
Publications 
 
 
- Annual reports 
 
- Special reports 
- Economic Report 
of 
 the President 
- Economic 
indicators 
- CEA White Papers 
- Presidential 
Briefings 
- Public statements 
and hearings 
- Reports on 
specific topics 
- Monthly 
Letter  
- Working 
Papers 
- Central 
Economic Plan 
- Special reports 
- Working 
Papers 
- White Papers 
Independence 
(rating) 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
average 
 
rather low 
 
An advisory board consisting of highly regarded academics could also be a 
disadvantage. Firstly, the academics do not have administrative experiences and 
secondly, the short tenure gives the CEA little continuity in dealing with long run or 
generational issues e.g. reform of the health care system. 
The Conseil d’Analyse Économique (CAE) was founded in 1997. This committee 
consists of approximately 30 independent professionals, usually professors in 
economics. The members represent different fields of research and schools of 
thought. The CAE is rather pluralistic in comparison to all other international 
advisory boards. Like the GCEE, the members of the CAE are independent. 
However, due to the institutional setup of the board, they are closer to the political 
bodies and thus more susceptible to political influence. According to the former 
chair Christian de Boissieu, a problem of the CAE is the acquisition of new members 
because the job is not paid and part-time. 
The task of the CAE is the publication of economic analyses on economic policy 
issues and the participation in economic debates.6 The CAE shall comment on recent 
economic challenges in order to close the gap between the view of the political 
administration and science. Lastly, the CAE publishes a report with policy 
conclusions, which are not necessarily unanimous agreements. Even though 
                                                 
6For example the CAE argued against the political project to reduce the working hours to 35 per week. 
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different opinions are tolerated, the members are prohibited from making official 
comments on behalf of the CAE. All reports are published and presented to the 
public through press conferences. The president of the CAE is the Premier Minister, 
whereby the CAE has a delegated president since 2001. The staff members of CAE 
consist of a general secretary and four economic experts. The CAE meets once a 
month for a general assembly in order to discuss certain issues on the Minister's 
demand. Afterwards the CAE publishes reports on the issues. The preparation of 
these (special) reports takes place in small groups. Those groups consist of business 
representatives, professionals and professors, who are not necessarily members of 
the CAE. The aim of such small groups is to provide strong expertise. 
The Dutch model, ‚Central Planning Bureau‛ (CPB), has a different concept from the 
previous pluralistic model. The CPB was founded directly after the Second World 
War in September, 1945. The politics declared that the government needed scientific 
expertise and insights for the configuration of economic policy. At the beginning, the 
focus of the CPB was on better economic developments and high level of 
employment. The chairperson of the CPB has been famous economists, mostly 
leading professors in Netherlands. The CPB publishes a ‚Central Economic Plan‛ 
(CEP) on a yearly basis. This report provides an overview of the actual economic 
situation. Moreover, the CPB publishes short- and mid-term economic forecasts as 
well as special forecasts at the beginning of every election cycle. Apart from the 
economic forecasts, the CPB analyses the election manifestos of all parties, and 
conducts cost-benefit analyses of infrastructure projects proposed by the 
government or parties. Thus, the CPB makes explicit political recommendations on 
the consequences of reform proposals. In addition, the CPB conducts basic research. 
Research topics are the economic effects of the aging society, globalisation, financial 
crisis and regulation of markets. The level of independence of the CPB is rather low 
because it is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The CPB’s chairperson is 
appointed by the minister, through consultation with other members of the 
government. However, the daily work is completely independent. Moreover, the 
CPB has an independent counsellor. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that, in some countries, advisory boards were abolished 
after some years of existence. For example, in 1993, the ‚Economic Council of 
Canada‛ was abolished after 30 years of operation. Another example is the Swiss 
advisory board (‚Expertengruppe Wirtschaftslage‛) which was abolished after only 
three years of existence in 1980. The reasons for the abrogation of these advisory 
boards were not examined scientifically. However, there are some hypotheses, 
which I explain at a later part of the article. Interestingly, the demand for advice is 
still present even in the aforementioned countries. Thus, there are other scientific 
committees supported by public money in all advanced countries. In conclusion, the 
four advisory boards show similarities and differences. The major difference is the 
independence of the boards and its relation to the administration. 
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How does an efficient advisory board look like? 
The question of efficient advice goes far beyond the advantages and disadvantages 
discussed so far. There exists even a literature, which is recognized (Kopits and 
Szymanski, 1998). It is important to note that the field of economic sciences has 
changed, similar to the technological change of the 21st century. In the 1960s, it was 
widely believed that economic policy could be easily developed by planning and 
rational decision-making. During that time, network effects, systemic risks, non-
linear dynamics, strategic decision-making and psychological elements did not play 
a role. Thus, there was a simple technocratic ‘zeitgeist’ (spirit of time). Policy-makers 
believed that any objective advice by scientific boards would be helpful for the 
decision-making. Admittedly, this has been proved an erroneous perception today. 
Even with good empirical and theoretical models, we are still unable to understand 
everything in a highly globalized and interconnected world. 
Once, Nobel laureate F. Hayek pointed out that we could never succeed in 
stimulating the economy through a planning board or ‚Computation machine‛ 
because market dynamics is too complex and non-linear (Brodbeck, 2004). A social 
science that deals with human aspects faces several challenges. Recent neuro-
scientific evidence demonstrates that the origin of erratic behaviour in financial 
markets is partly due to human evolution. In the end, modern economics agree that 
the economy is not a natural science. Even though the economy does not follow 
mathematical regularities, economic models still provide useful insights. Firstly, 
normative statements are abstracted in models and secondly, the models are long 
run oriented, i.e. beyond the electoral budget cycles. Of course, in order to enforce 
and implement reforms, policy-makers need to have parliamentarian majorities and 
not only good advice.  
Every advice has shortcomings and limitations. All economic schools of thought, 
despite their eligibility, relay on fundamental assumptions. In economics, we mainly 
distinguish between short-run versus long-run or demand-side versus supply-side. 
Even if the assumptions are transparent, political decision-making is still challenging 
especially under the uncertainties of reality. In general, the major advantage of 
economic boards is their unique perspective – this is a constitutive feature of 
economic sciences. Economics compares alternatives in terms of efficiency. Thus, 
there is never a single solution to an economic problem. In fact, there could be many 
possibilities depending on political beliefs.  
For instance, some years ago, there was a debate on a major tax reform in Germany. 
The scientific advisory board of the federal Minister for Economic Affairs preferred a 
progressive tax model (three-step-tariff). Other advisers for the federal ministry for 
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Financial Affairs were in favour of the linear-progressive model. Again, other 
experts such as professor Kirchhoff, preferred a flat-tax. All alternatives were 
economically sensible. However, all were based on different assumptions regarding 
the desired distribution effect. Nevertheless, politics was responsible for choosing 
the alternative with the distribution effect according to their belief. 
Another problem is that political decision-making bears always the risks of 
uncertainty. The reunification of Germany in the early 1990s or the solution of the 
European sovereign debt crisis in 2010, are just two examples. Almost no economists 
had experience in the underlying problems beforehand. Nevertheless, the policy-
makers had to make immediate decisions. Admittedly, economic advice, in such a 
situation, is often useless. However, this is the task of elected representatives. They 
have to make (rather insecure) decisions based on his or her beliefs in any situation. 
According to Max Weber (1922) this is political responsibility: ‚Because there are 
only two mortal sins in the field of politics: lack of objectivity and often, but not 
always identical, irresponsibility‚. Thus, political responsibility is more than the 
falsification of a theory. 
So, what is an efficient interaction between politics and economic sciences? A key 
problem for an efficient interaction between both spheres is the diversity of interests. 
This problem explains why advisory boards, in Switzerland and Canada, were 
removed after some time. In countries based upon the principle of federalism, 
advisory boards have a more difficult standing (including Germany). Moreover, the 
interaction between politics and economics is often difficult because policy-makers 
commonly argue with market failures, while economists argue with policy failures 
(Coase, 1937). Certainly, both speak of truth but economists believe they are right 
due to their scientific approach. Admittedly, this is the-chicken-or-the-egg problem 
because markets as well as political failures are interdependent. 
NEED FOR MODERNIZATION? 
In the past, the relationship between economic sciences and policy was not always at 
ease. Even in Germany, some policy-makers suggested the abolition of the GCEE, e.g. 
a former German minister of Economic Affairs Otto Graf von Lambsdorff 
(Lambsdorff, 2003 and 2008; Kirchgässner, 2009). Thereby discussions concerning the 
future of advisory boards emerged in recent years (Scheide, 2005; Schmidt, 2006; 
Zimmermann, 2008). Certainly, economic advice and political demands have 
changed considerably. This development has already resulted in changes in the 
GCEE as previously explained. For instance, since 2007, the GCEE has been 
preparing special reports in spring in addition to the annual report in autumn. What 
are the reasons for this debate and what calls for a modernization? 
Undoubtedly, in Germany, there is a huge variety of advisory committees, councils, 
boards, expert groups and government-funded economic research institutes. Over 
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the past 50 years, policy-makers implemented a multitude of boards without any 
strategy. At the same time, the workload of each advisory board increased without 
any compensation. Consequently, both sides of the coin are dissatisfied. Compared 
to international boards and professors in the Switzerland, the US, Canada, Italy and 
France, Germany offers low salaries and staff support. Furthermore, as explained 
above, in Germany economists are rather considered as troublemakers than advisors. 
This view has a long history, since Konrad Adenauer's regime. Nevertheless, it is a 
phenomenon in other countries as well. The American president Truman once 
wished a ‚one-handed‛ economist. He wanted economic advisory who do not argue 
on the one hand and on the other hand. Thus, he wanted to stay away from 
economists who seek alternatives (Wiegard, 2003). 
There is definitely a need for constructive dialogs, which do not substitute politics 
but accompany and facilitate decisions. Another dilemma is that the public and 
politics often feel wrongly advised, whilst scientists often feel misunderstood. There 
are many reasons for all these dilemmas: 
a) Political debates are regularly driven by short-run news or election dates. This 
artificial time pressure encourages dependent boards to publish quick shots 
without enough self-reflection. We need solid research, even if it is not 
feasible to provide answers for any short-run problem. Scientific rigour 
requires time. 
b) Politics often ignores important opposing views. Thus, simplification does not 
only disappoint the scientists but also endangers public resistance to advice. 
c) The emergence of the private consultancy industry increased the competition 
between the political advisories, however, not at the same level playing field. 
Public financed institutions lack on manpower and money. Moreover, 
consultancy firms have not the same degree of independence. They follow 
profit interests and their suggestions could contain hidden interests.7 
d) The communication strategy of complex scientific proposals in a media driven 
and short-run focused world is more difficult too. 
e) Finally, politics does not always accept that ‚good or efficient‛ advice is never 
a single solution rather alternatives. 
                                                 
7Professor Martin Hellwig described this problem during an international conference on the ‚50 years of 
Sachverständigenrat‛ on the 20th of February 2013: Since a couple of years, we have in Germany a partly 
systematic concealment of important (economic) debates. This explains on the one hand the weak interest for the 
state-owned advisory committees, such as the ‚Sachverständigenrat‛ and the monopoly commission, since 
economic challenges are not even discussed in politics and the public. On the other hand, the legitimacy of these 
committees suffers because the public neither realize nor classify the good contributions of these independent 
entities.  
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Thus, I see the following enhancements and steps for a modernization: 
o Avoid expert advice in a too ritualized format. Currently, we have in almost 
all parliaments many hearings that serve just an alibi mechanism. 
o The independence of advisory boards is a valuable and important source. The 
advantage of independence is a frank assessment without hidden interests or 
normative views. 
o Despite different scientific views, advisory boards should try to speak with 
one voice. 
o Do not overburden existing advisory boards with ad hoc reports, even though 
there are many current challenges. 
o Adapt the goals and tasks of advisory boards over time. New challenges or 
institutional changes need new or other advisory boards. 
o Modern advisory boards have to study systemic risks, and thus have to widen 
the focus from domestic to international issues and interdisciplinary 
approaches. 
o Facilitate an exchange of ideas between politics and science. This would 
enrich and improve the understanding of both sides. 
o Economists should concentrate on the big picture. They have no comparative 
advantage in the development of legal proposals or even a final bill. 
In principle, efficient advice does not only require scientific rigour rather a mutual 
understanding. For instance, advisers must demonstrate humility in respect to the 
legal and practical challenges. Moreover, I do not deny the need of private 
consultancy firms, however, the analysis above demonstrates that neither external 
nor internal, neither independent nor commercial has absolute advantages. In brief, 
there is not a lack of advice but there is a lack of ‚serious‛ advice. Finally, I would 
like to emphasize that, also according to the law of the GCEE, efficient advice has to 
"assess" and not "advise". An efficient assessment must be objective and thus made 
by an independent council. 
CONCLUSION 
The German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE) has good reasons to celebrate its 
50 years existence. Without doubt, in international comparison, its framework is 
unique and has an excellent reputation. Nevertheless, the world has changed and 
thus even the GCEE requires some changes in future. Politics should get efficient 
advice to tackle the future challenges ahead. It would definitely be wrong to reduce 
or abolish scientific boards despite current tensions between both spheres. An 
independent and rigorous assessment of economic issues remains essential in 
politics even in future. 
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